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In recent years economists have made considerable strides in articulating the costs of various
policies to reduce U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases.  Most analyses
emphasize economy-wide costs, giving relatively little attention to how the costs are distributed.  Yet
the distributional impacts of policies clearly are relevant to social welfare, and such impacts often
determine political feasibility.  
The distribution of the effects of  environmental policies can be measured along a number of
dimensions – across household income groups, across geographic regions, across generations, and
across industries.  The distribution across industries is very important in environmental policy debates,
partly because the industries that would experience significant adverse impacts can importantly affect
political outcomes.  There are several potential explanations for the significant influence of industry
groups in the political process.  One influential explanation was articulated by Mancur Olson (1965)
nearly four decades ago.  Olson argued that the degree of political mobilization of a particular interest
group is likely to depend on the concentration of the impact of the potential policy.  When potential
costs, in particular, are concentrated on relatively few economic agents (as opposed to widely
dispersed among a great many), such agents have strong incentives to become involved politically. 
Concentrated potential costs may justify significant contributions of time and other resources to become
engaged in the political process.  It may be worth undertaking the fixed costs, in particular, of political
involvement.  If costs are sufficiently concentrated relative to benefits, the agents who would face these
costs can have greater influence in the political process than those who would benefit, even if aggregate
costs are smaller than aggregate benefits.
The political strength of industry stakeholders can partly explain why certain cost-effective or
(arguably) efficient environmental policies have failed to achieve political success in the U.S.  For CO2
abatement, in particular, the most cost-effective approaches for reducing fossil-fuel-based emissions are
carbon taxes and auctioned tradeable carbon permits.  Under both of these policies, a significant share
of the economy-wide cost would fall on major energy industries.  These industries are highly mobilized
politically and can block passage of such policies.
These considerations motivate examining the industry-distribution effects of environmental
policies, and exploring whether policies can be designed to avoid “unacceptable” distributional effects
with a minimal loss of cost-effectiveness or efficiency.  The present research for the Energy Foundation
employs a numerically solved general equilibrium model to assess the economy-wide costs of avoiding
or mitigating adverse distributional impacts of CO2 policies on important U.S. industries. The model1This assumes that the level of government spending is the same across the policies under comparison.  If
the collection of government revenue through carbon taxes or auctioned permits tended to generate higher
government spending than other policies that do not yield as much revenue, then the efficiency advantage of carbon
taxes or auctioned permits could disappear.  This would depend on the social return to the additional government
spending.
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also helps identify how policies can be designed to keep adverse industry costs low.
Results from the model indicate that the efficiency cost of avoiding losses of profit to fossil fuel
industries is relatively modest.  This finding mirrors results obtained in an earlier paper (Bovenberg and
Goulder [2000]).  A key recognition underlying this finding is that CO2 abatement policies have the
potential to  produce very large rents to the regulated firms.  By compelling fossil fuel suppliers to
restrict their outputs, the government effectively causes firms to behave like a cartel, leading to higher
prices and the potential for excess profit.  To the extent that the environmental policy enables the firms
to retain these rents – such is the case under a CO2 policy involving freely offered (or “grandfathered”)
tradeable permits – the firms can make considerably higher profit under regulation than in its absence. 
Correspondingly, the government needs to leave with firms only a fraction of these potential rents in
order to preserve the profits of the regulated industries.  In the present research we find that only a
small fraction – around 13 percent – of the CO2 permits must freely provided in order to prevent losses
of profit to fossil fuel industries under a CO2 abatement policy.
Government revenue has an efficiency value because it can be used to finance cuts in pre-
existing distortionary taxes.  Thus, the most cost-effective CO2 policies are carbon taxes, and auctioned
CO2 permit systems in which the permits are initially auctioned (rather than freely provided).  These
policies collect as government revenue all of the potential rents produced by the regulations.1  However,
with only a small sacrifice of the potential revenue (by freely allocating a small percentage of the
permits, introducing minor inframarginal exemptions to a carbon tax, or providing modest corporate
income tax relief), profits can be preserved.  And since the revenue sacrifice is small relative to the total
potential rent or revenue, the efficiency cost of meeting the distributional constraints is small as well. 
Although the burden borne by fossil fuel producers is large enough in absolute terms to motivate
substantial concern and political involvement, it nonetheless is small relative to the potential revenue that
these policies could generate.  Hence the efficiency cost of policies that avoid serious impacts on these
industries is small relative to that of the most cost-effective policies.
 Our earlier analysis focused mainly on how regulations affect the cost of “upstream” firms –
fossil fuel suppliers.  The present study expands on the earlier analysis, considering as well the costs
imposed on“downstream” industries.  We examine the cost of “widening the net” to protect profits of
other, downstream industries that otherwise would face significant losses from pollution-abatement
policies.  How much does the efficiency cost grow as the “compensation net” becomes wider?  We find
that the costs of “insulating” a wider group of industries are modest as well.  The reason is that much of
the cost of a CO2 policy is already shifted to consumers; hence the compensation required to offset the2The permits policies were equivalent in the sense that the number of permits issued was such as to
generate a market price of $25 per ton for the permits.
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loss of profit in these industries is fairly small.
Section 2 below briefly describes the new work performed for the present study.  Section 3
describes the policy experiments conducted.  Section 4 provides theoretical issues underlying the
impacts of the various policies on industry output and profits.  Section 5 presents and interprets the
results from numerical simulations.  The final section offers conclusions.
2.  New Elements in This Study
This study extended prior work with the numerical general equilibrium model in three main
ways.
First, it refined and updated the data set used to perform policy experiments.  The benchmark
year for all policy experiments is the year 2000; thus the initial conditions for the economy are those that
prevailed in that year.  The new data set uses more recent information to generate the year-2000 data
set than previously was available.  In particular, it makes use of fairly recent input-output data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce (www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn2/i-o.htm). 
In addition, it employs very recent data on consumption expenditure, investment, and government
spending from the National Income and Product Accounts (www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb).  New
data on capital stocks were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Fixed Tangible Wealth
in the United States.  Other data, including data on fuel prices and various tax rates, were also
updated.
A second extension is to examine new and different profiles for carbon taxes (or tradeable
permits prices).  Prior work focused on a constant (in real terms) $25 per ton carbon tax, or on
equivalent tradeable permits policies.2   In the present study we focus on a carbon tax that rises through
time, starting at $25 per ton but rising at either seven percent or nine percent per year, until the tax
reaches a value of $50 per ton.  From that time period on the carbon tax is held constant in real terms
at $50 per ton.  We also consider tradeable permits policies that lead to paths of permit prices that
match the carbon tax paths just described.  When permits prices match carbon tax rates in this way, a
tradeable permits policy sometimes can be expected to have the same overall economic impact as a
carbon tax policy.  However, this is not always the case.  As discussed below, a permits policy can
have very different overall cost impacts if the permits are given out free. 
The third extension is to consider a wider set of compensation schemes.  As indicated in the4
introduction, prior work concentrated on “insulating” the profits of the fossil fuel producing industries. 
In this study we consider the added costs of widening the insulation net to protect profits of
“downstream” industries, particularly those industries that use carbon-based fuels.  These industries
include the electric utility, petroleum refining, and metals&machinery industries.
3.  Policies Considered
The different policy experiments are listed below.  In all simulations the initial value of the
carbon tax or the initial price of tradeable CO2 permits is $25/ton.
A.  Carbon Tax Policies without Earmarked Compensation
A1. Constant carbon tax with revenues rebated as lump-sum transfers to households
A2. Carbon tax growing at 7% per year, revenues rebated as lump-sum transfers to households
A3. Carbon tax growing at 9% per year, revenues rebated as lump-sum transfers to households
A4. Carbon tax growing at 7% per year, revenues rebated through reductions in marginal rates of
the personal income tax
A5. Carbon tax growing at 9% per year, revenues rebated through reductions in marginal rates of
the personal income tax.
B.  Permits Policies
Each of these policies involves a profile of tradeable carbon permits that leads to permits prices
(in dollars per ton) match those of the carbon tax in A2 (or A4) above.  That is, the permits price starts
at $25/ton and rises at 7% per year until it reaches a price of $50/ton, at which point the price remains
constant at $50/ton.
B1.   All permits auctioned
B2.   Partial free allocation – enough to preserve profits in fossil fuel industries
B3.   All permits freely allocated
C.  Carbon Tax Policies with Compensation
These policies all involve time-profiles of carbon taxes matching that in A2 (or A4)  above.
C1. Corporate tax credits to the coal and oil&gas industries3This analysis abstracts from uncertainty.  The presence of uncertainty introduces differences in the
relative attractiveness, ex ante, of price instruments (like a carbon tax) and quantity instruments (like emissions
permits).  See Weitzman (1974), Stavins (1996).  Recent applications to stock pollutants are provided by Hoel and
Karp (1998) and Newell and Pizer (2000).
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C2. Like C1, but also including corporate tax credits to the  electric utilities industry
C3. Like C2, but also including corporate tax credits to the petroleum refining industry
C4. Like C3, but also including corporate tax credits to the metals&machinery industry
4.  Theoretical Underpinnings: Relationships between Abatement Policies and Profits
To provide background for interpreting the simulation results below, we offer here a heuristic
presentation of key relationships between pollution-abatement policies and profits.  This highlights the
importance of whether the “potential revenues” from carbon abatement policies in fact become
government revenue or instead are retained as rents by the polluting firms.  The former case applies
under a standard carbon tax, or under a system of tradeable permits in which the permits are auctioned. 
The latter case applies under a carbon tax with an inframarginal exemption, or under a tradeable
permits system in which at least some of the permits are initially given out free.  The major insights from
this heuristic presentation are:  (1) carbon-abatement policies can create “potential revenues” that are
very large in relation to the loss of producer surplus that standard policies would cause, and (2) to
preserve firms’ profits it suffices either to allow a small fraction of the potential revenues to materialize
as private rents (rather than actual government revenues), or to provide corporate tax relief that is
relatively small in comparison to the “potential revenues.  The numerical results in Bovenberg and
Goulder (2000) and the present study support these findings.  We find that the relative sacrifice of
revenue is indeed quite small and that, as a result, the major fossil fuel producers can be compensated
at relatively low efficiency cost.
We start by comparing two polar cases – where all potential revenues are collected by the
government, and where all revenues are retained by firms.  We discuss intermediate cases later.  
a.  CO2 Abatement Policies with All “Potential Revenues” Collected by the Government
The effects of these policies are suggested by Figure 1.3  The line labeled  S0  in the figure is the
supply curve for coal in the absence of the carbon tax.  This diagram accounts for the quasi-fixed nature
of capital resulting from capital adjustment costs.  The supply curve  S0  should be regarded as an
average of an infinite number of supply curves, beginning with the curve depicting the marginal cost of
changes in supply in the first instant, and culminating with the marginal cost of changing supply over the4In the long run, in contrast, capital is fully mobile, production exhibits constant returns to scale, and the
supply curve is infinitely elastic.
5 Our focus on the use of inframarginal exemptions to accomplish distributional objectives is in the spirit of
Farrow (1999), who employs a model along the lines of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) with one factor of production
(labor).  Our current analysis differs from Farrow’s, however, in including capital as an imperfectly mobile factor. 
This enables us to consider the extent to which potential revenues are divided between lost consumer surplus aehb
and lost gross producer surplus bhgc, and permits us to examine the impacts on firms’ profits.  In the absence of
imperfectly mobile capital, all potential revenues become lost consumer surplus, and none of the burden of
regulation is borne by producers.
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very long term, when all factors are mobile.  This curve therefore indicates the average of the
discounted marginal costs of expanding production, given the size of the initial capital stock.  We draw
the supply curve as upward sloping, in keeping with the fact that in all time frames except the very long
run capital is not fully mobile and production exhibits decreasing returns in the variable factors – labor
and intermediate inputs.4 
The supply curve represents the marginal costs associated with increments in the use of variable
factors to increase supply.  Capital is the fixed factor underlying the upward-sloping supply curve.5  The
return to this factor is the producer surplus in the diagram.  With an upward sloping supply curve, this
producer surplus is positive.  The existence of producer surplus does not necessarily imply supernormal
profits.  Indeed, in an initial long-run equilibrium, the producer surplus is just large enough to yield a
normal return on the capital stock.  To illustrate, at the initial equilibrium with a market price  p0  and
aggregate quantity supplied  Q0,  the producer surplus amounts to the triangular area bhd.  On a
balanced growth path, this producer surplus yields a normal (market) return on the initial capital stock
so that the value of the initial capital stock equals the price of investment (and thus Tobin’s q is unity). 
Now consider the impact of an unanticipated carbon (coal) tax.  The introduction of this tax
shifts the supply curve upward to S1.  As a direct consequence, the output price paid by coal
consumers increases from  p0  to  pD1.  However, since supply is not infinitely elastic, the suppliers of
coal are not able to shift the entire burden of the tax onto demanders.  Indeed, the producer price of
coal declines to  pS1.  This causes producer surplus to shrink to the area  cgd.   Since this triangle is
smaller than the initial producer surplus, the return on the initial capital stock (valued at the price of
investment goods) falls short of the market rate of return.  Hence, to satisfy the arbitrage condition,
Tobin’s  q  falls below unity and the owners of the capital stock suffer a capital loss. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that the carbon tax can finance reductions in other
taxes, which may imply reductions in costs to firms.  This will tend to offset the carbon-tax-induced
losses in profits and the associated reductions in equity values.  To the extent that the carbon tax
revenues finance general (economy-wide) reductions in personal or corporate income taxes, the
reductions in tax rates will be small and thus will exert only a small impact on costs to the fossil fuel6 Fullerton and Metcalf (2000) emphasize the importance of rents to the overall efficiency costs of policies to
reduce pollution.  In the present study, we examine the extent to which policy-generated rents affect the impacts of
policies on the profitability and equity values of regulated fims.
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industries.  If the revenues are recycled through tax cuts targeted for the fossil-fuel industries, however,
the changes in marginal rates can be significant and the beneficial offsetting impact on profits and equity
values may be more pronounced.
b.  CO2 Abatement Policies with All “Potential Revenues” Retained by Firms
  
In the diagram, the shaded rectangle R  (with area aegc) represents the firms’ payments of the
carbon tax.  If the government forgoes the potential tax revenue, and allows producers to retain this
potential revenue as a rent,6 the impact on profits, dividends, and equity values is fundamentally
different.  Consider, for example, the case in which the government restricts CO2 emissions through a
system of tradeable carbon permits.  Since such emissions are proportional to coal combustion, the
government can accomplish a given percentage reduction in emissions from coal by restricting coal
output by that same percentage through the sale of a limited number of coal-supply permits.  For
comparability, suppose that the number of permits restricts supply to the level Q1  in the figure.  If the
permits are auctioned competitively, then the government (ideally) collects the revenue  R   from sale of
the permits and the effects on firms are the same as under the carbon tax.  In contrast, if the permits are
given out free, then the area  R  represents a rent to firms.  The government-mandated restriction in
output causes prices to rise, but there is no increase in costs of production (indeed, marginal production
costs are lower).
As suggested by the figure, this rent can be quite large and, indeed, can imply substantial
increases in profits and equity values to the regulated industries.   In the figure, the post-regulation
profits enjoyed by the firm are given by the sum of areas  R  and  cgd.  Here post-regulation profits are
many times higher than the profit prior to regulation (bhd).   Owners of industry-specific capital enjoy a
capital gain as Tobin’s  q  jumps above unity.  Intuitively, by restricting output, government policy
allows producers as a group to exploit their market power and reap part of the original consumer
surplus.
Using comparable diagrams, it is straightforward to verify that the magnitude of the profit
increase under a system of freely allocated emissions permits is positively related to the price elasticity
of supply and negatively related to the price elasticity of demand.  It also depends on the extent of
abatement (or number of permits issued relative to “business-as-usual” emissions), with such profits
vanishing as the extent of abatement becomes very large.  
In sum, the impact on firms’ profits and equity values can be fundamentally different, depending
on how much of the “potential revenue” area  R  is retained by firms, rather than collected by the8
government.  The impact also depends on how much of the potential revenue area  R  lies above the
initial equilibrium price.  The latter, in turn, depends on the extent of abatement and on elasticities of
supply and demand.
This heuristic presentation suggests, but does not confirm, that the potential revenue area R  will
be quite large relative to the gross loss of producer surplus.  The numerical simulations performed for
this study provide evidence that this is indeed the case.  The numerical model incorporates, in each
industry, adjustment costs associated with the installation or removal of physical capital.  Even with
these adjustment costs, the elasticity of supply ends up being fairly high relative to the elasticity of
demand.  In addition, in these industries the share of total production cost represented by capital is
fairly small.  Together, these factors create a situation where firms can be compensated with relatively
little sacrifice of potential tax revenue.
5.  Brief Description of the Simulation Model
This section briefly describes the numerical model employed in this study, an intertemporal
general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy with international trade.  This model generates paths of
equilibrium prices, outputs, and incomes for the U.S. economy and the “rest of the world” under
specified policy scenarios.  All variables are calculated at yearly intervals beginning in the benchmark
year 2000 and usually extending to the year 2080.
One of the most important and distinguishing features of the model is its attention to the
adjustment costs associated with the installation or reallocation of physical capital (structures and
equipment).  This is critical to understanding the effects of abatement policies on profits in various
industries.  Most CGE models ignore such adjustment costs, thus treating physical capital as perfectly
mobile across industries.  In such models capital immediately is reallocated across industries following a
policy change in such a way as to bring marginal products of capital to equality.  Profit rates are also
instantly equalized across industries.  This is unrealistic and prevents analysis of how environmental
policies differentially affect the profits of different industries.  Assessing the industry profit impacts
requires a careful attention to the costs of installing or removing physical capital, and the relationship of
these costs to profitability.  The present model differs from most numerical general equilibrium models in
attending to adjustment costs associated with changes in industry capital stocks, and in linking these
costs to investment decisions and profits in a consistent way.
Other main features of the model include a fairly realistic treatment of the U.S. tax system and a
detailed representation of energy production and demand.  The model incorporates specific tax
instruments and addresses effects of taxation along a number of important dimensions.  These include7Here the model applies the asset price approach to investment developed in Summers (1981).
8The functions f, g, and h, and the aggregation functions for the composites E, M, and  , are CES and ¯ xi
exhibit constant returns to scale.  Consumer goods are produced by combining outputs from the 13 industries in
fixed proportions.
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firms' investment incentives, equity values, and profits,7 and household consumption, saving and labor
supply decisions.  The specification of energy supply incorporates the nonrenewable nature of crude
petroleum and natural gas and the transitions from conventional to synthetic fuels.
U.S. production divides into the 13 industries indicated in Table 1.  The energy industries
consist of (i) coal mining ; (ii) crude petroleum and natural gas extraction; (iii) petroleum refining; (iv)
synthetic fuels; (v) electric utilities; and (vi) gas utilities.  The model also distinguishes the  17  consumer
goods shown in the table.
A.  Producer Behavior
General Specifications.  In each industry, a nested production structure accounts for
substitution between different forms of energy as well as between energy and other inputs.  Each
industry produces a distinct output (X), which is a function of the inputs of labor (L), capital (K), an
energy composite (E) and a materials composite (M), as well as the current level of investment (I):
(1) X ’ f (g(L,K),h(E,M)] & f (I/K) @ I
The energy composite is made up of the outputs of the six energy industries, while the materials
composite consists of the outputs of the other industries:
(2) E ’ E(¯ x2, ¯ x3 % ¯ x4, ¯ x5, ¯ x6, ¯ x7)
(3) M ’ M (¯ x1, ¯ x8, ..., ¯ x13)
where   is a composite of domestically produced and foreign made input i.8   Industry indices ¯ xi
correspond to those in Table 1.
Managers of firms choose input quantities and investment levels to maximize the value of the
firm.  The investment decision takes account of the adjustment (or installation) costs represented by  9The function  f   represents adjustment costs per unit of investment.  This function expresses the notion
that installing new capital necessitates a loss of current output, as existing inputs (K, L, E and M) are diverted to
install new capital.
10We assume representative oil and gas firms:  initial resource stocks, profit-maximizing extraction levels,
and resource-stock effects are identical across producers.
11Thus, inputs 3 (oil&gas) and 4 (synfuels) enter additively in the energy aggregation function shown in
equation (2).
12The world price is specified to be $20 per barrel in 2000.  Following Gaskins and Weyant (1996), we assume
this price will rise by $5.00 (in year-2000 dollars) per decade.
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f(I/K) I    in  equation (1).  f  is a convex function of the rate of investment, I/K.9  As mentioned,
attention to these adjustment costs is critical to gauging the profit-impacts of government policies.
Special Features of the Oil-Gas and Synfuels Industries.  The production structure in the oil
and gas industry is somewhat more complex than in other industries to account for the nonrenewable
nature of oil and gas stocks.  The production specification is:
(4) I K I M E h K L g f Z X ￿ - ￿ = ) / ( )] , ( ), , ( [ ) ( j g
where g  is a decreasing function of Z, the cumulative extraction of oil and gas up to the beginning of the
current period.  This captures the idea that as  Z  rises (or, equivalently, as reserves are depleted), it
becomes increasingly difficult to extract oil and gas resources, so that greater quantities of K, L, E, and
M are required to achieve any given level of extraction (output).  Each oil and gas producer perfectly
recognizes the impact of its current production decisions on future extraction costs.10  Increasing
production costs ultimately induce oil and gas producers to remove their capital from this industry. 
The model incorporates a synthetic fuel -- shale oil -- as a backstop resource, a perfect
substitute for oil and gas.11  The technology for producing synthetic fuels on a commercial scale is
assumed to become known in 2020.  Thus, capital formation in the synfuels industry cannot begin until
that year.
All domestic prices in the model are endogenous, except for the domestic price of oil and gas. 
The path of oil and gas prices follows the assumptions of the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum.12  The
supply of imported oil and gas is taken to be perfectly elastic at the world price.   So long as imports
are the marginal source of supply to the domestic economy, domestic producers of oil and gas receive
the world price (adjusted for tariffs or taxes) for their own output.  However, rising oil and gas prices
stimulate investment in synfuels.  Eventually, synfuels production plus domestic oil and gas supply
together satisfy all of domestic demand.  Synfuels then become the marginal source of supply, so that13For details, see Goulder (1994, 1995a).
14Thus, we adopt the assumption of Armington (1969).
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the cost of synfuels production rather than the world oil price dictates the domestic price of fuels.13
B.  Household Behavior
Consumption, labor supply, and saving result from the decisions of a representative household
maximizing its intertemporal utility, defined on leisure and overall consumption in each period.  The
utility function is homothetic and leisure and consumption are weakly separable (see appendix).  The
household faces an intertemporal budget constraint requiring that the present value of consumption not
exceed potential total wealth (nonhuman wealth plus the present value of labor and transfer income).  In
each period, overall consumption of goods and services is allocated across the 17 specific categories of
consumption goods or services shown in Table 1.  Each of the 17 consumption goods or services is a
composite of a domestically and foreign-produced consumption good (or service) of that type. 
Households substitute between domestic and foreign goods to minimize the cost of obtaining a given
composite.
C.  The Government Sector
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, and purchases goods and services (outputs
of the 13 industries).  The tax instruments include energy taxes, output taxes, the corporate income tax,
property taxes, sales taxes, and taxes on individual labor and capital income.  In the benchmark year,
2000, the government deficit amounts to approximately two percent of GDP.  In the reference case (or
status quo) simulation, the real deficit grows at the steady-state growth rate given by the growth of
potential labor services.  In the policy-change cases, we require that real government spending and the
real deficit follow the same paths as in the reference case.  To make the policy changes revenue-neutral,
we accompany the tax rate increases that define the various policies with reductions in other taxes,
either on a lump-sum basis (increased exogenous transfers) or through reductions in marginal tax rates.
D.  Foreign Trade
Except for oil and gas imports, imported intermediate and consumer goods are imperfect
substitutes for their domestic counterparts.14  Import prices are exogenous in foreign currency, but the
domestic-currency price changes with variations in the exchange rate.  Export demands are modeled as
functions of the foreign price of U.S. exports and the level of foreign income (in foreign currency).  The15Since agents are forward-looking, equilibrium in each period depends not only on current prices and taxes
but on future magnitudes as well.
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exchange rate adjusts to balance trade in every period.
E.  Equilibrium and Growth
The solution of the model is a general equilibrium in which supplies and demands balance in all
markets at each period of time.  The requirements of the general equilibrium are that supply equal
demand for labor inputs and for all produced goods, that firms' demands for loanable funds match the
aggregate supply by households, and that the government's tax revenues equal its spending less the
current deficit.  These conditions are met through adjustments in output prices, in the market interest
rate, and in lump-sum taxes or marginal tax rates.15
      Economic growth reflects the growth of capital stocks and of potential labor resources.  The growth
of capital stocks stems from endogenous saving and investment behavior.  Potential labor resources are
specified as increasing at an exogenous rate.
6.  Simulation Results
This section provides and interprets results from simulations.  In subsection A below, we
examine the impacts of policies that do not involve any provisions to protect profits or equity values of
key energy industries.  The economic impacts of these policies form a reference point against which one
can view the added cost of policies that mitigate the impacts on particular industries, either through free
provision of carbon permits (discussed in subsection B) or by tax credits to particular industries
(discussed in subsection C).
A.  Policies without Distributional Adjustments
1.  Lump-Sum Recycling
Under policies A1-A3, a carbon tax is introduced and the revenues are recycled to the
economy as lump-sum transfers to households.  Under Policy A1, the tax is held constant at $25/ton. 
Under policies A2 and A3, the tax rises at an annual rate of seven and nine percent, respectively, until
the tax rate reaches $50/ton.  This occurs after eleven years under Policy A2, and after nine years
under A3.  16This is the reduction in emissions associated with domestic consumption of fossil fuels.  It accounts for
the carbon content of imported fossil fuels, and excludes the carbon content of exported fossil fuels.  These figures
do not adjust for changes in the carbon content of imported or exported refined products.  The percent change in
emissions is the percentage change, between the reference case and policy-change case, in the “present value” of
emissions, where the emissions stream is discounted using the after-tax interest rate.  If marginal environmental
damages from emissions are constant, the percentage changes in discounted emissions will be equivalent to
percentage changes in damages.
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Results are summarized in Table 2.  The table shows the impacts on prices, output, and after-
tax profits fort years 2002 (two years after implementation) and 2025.
Under all three of these policies, the coal industry experiences the largest impact on prices and
output.  In this industry, prices rise by 46-55 percent by the time the policy is fully implemented (year
2002).  Under policies A2 and A3, which involve rising carbon taxes, coal prices continue to increase
significantly after 2002.  By 2025, coal prices rise by 105.8 and 107.2 percent, respectively, under
these two policies, reflecting the fact that the carbon tax has reached $50/ton by that time.
The price increases imply reductions in coal output of about 18-21 percent in the short term. 
When the carbon tax is kept constant at $25/ton (Policy A1), coal output falls by about 26 percent in
the long run.  Under the growing carbon tax (policies A2 and A3), the long-run impact on coal output is
about 39 percent.  These results imply a general equilibrium elasticity of demand of approximately 0.4
for coal.
In other industries the price impacts are not nearly so large.  Although the carbon tax is
imposed on the oil&gas industry, the resulting price increase is considerably smaller than in the coal
industry, reflecting the lower carbon content (per dollar of fuel) of oil and gas as compared with coal. 
There are significant increases in prices and reductions in output in the petroleum refining and electric
utilities industries as well, in keeping with the significant use of fossil fuels in these industries.  The
reductions in output are accompanied by reductions in annual after-tax profits.
The reductions in after-tax profits are associated with reductions in equity values (the present
value of after-tax dividends net of new share issues).  As shown in Table 3, the largest equity-value
impacts are in the coal industry, where such values fall by about 43 percent under Policy A1 and 55-58
percent under policies A2 and A3.  The reductions in equity values in the oil&gas, petroleum refining,
and electric utilities industries are also substantial, in the range of 4-19 percent.  As indicated in the
table, the impacts on equity values of other industries are relatively small.  Natural gas distribution
enjoys an increase in equity values.  This reflects the higher demands for natural gas as users of energy
switch from coal, which experiences much greater price increases.
Table 4 indicates impacts on CO2 emissions.  Policy A1 leads to a reduction in emissions of
about 11 percent relative to the business-as-usual case.  Policies A2 and A3 lead to reductions of
about 18 percent.1617Policy A1 matches a simulation considered in the earlier study.  The costs under Policy A1 are in fact
greater than those observed for the comparable prior simulation.  One reason for this is that in our improved data set,
the oil&gas industry is somewhat more carbon-intensive than in the earlier data set.  The greater carbon intensity of
the new data set also implies a larger impact on the overall economy.  The $25/ton carbon tax now generates more
revenue and implies a larger overall efficiency loss.  Our current data set shows a loss of $1190 billion, as compared
with $817 billion under the previous data set.  However, the costs per ton of emission reduction are quite similar
under the two data sets: $102.6 under the old data set, and $104.2 under the new data set.
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Table 4 also indicates carbon tax revenues and efficiency impacts.  We employ the equivalent
variation measure of the efficiency impacts.  This is a gross measure because the numerical model does
not account for the benefits associated with the environmental improvement from reduced emissions. 
We refer to the negative of the equivalent variation as the gross efficiency cost or loss.  As indicated in
the table, Policy A1 implies a gross efficiency loss of approximately $104 per ton of emissions reduced,
or 56 cents per dollar of discounted gross revenue from the carbon tax.  Policies A2 and A3 lead to
efficiency losses of about $127 per ton of emissions reduced, or 63 cents per dollar of discounted gross
carbon tax revenue.  
The earlier study, Bovenberg and Goulder (2000), focused on policies involving carbon tax
rates or permits prices that remained constant at $25/ton.  In contrast, with the exception of Policy A1
the simulation experiments in the present study involve carbon tax rates or permits prices that grow
from $25/ton to $50/ton. Thus the policies currently examined are more stringent than those in the
earlier study.  This partly explains why the impacts on prices, output, as well as the overall economic
costs, are significantly higher than those obtained in the previous study.  Another reason for the larger
impacts is that the newer data set reveals the oil&gas industry to be more carbon-intensive than
indicated by the earlier data set.17
2.  Personal Income Tax Recycling
Policies A4 and A5 are similar to policies A2 and A3, except that they involve recycling of the
revenues through personal income tax cuts rather than via lump-sum payments.  A comparison in tables
2 and 3 of columns A4 and A2, or of columns A5 and A3, indicates that the method of recycling has
relatively little effect on prices, profits, or equity values of the fossil fuel industries or of the energy-
intensive industries such as electric utilities and petroleum refining.  However, as indicated in Table 4,
the method of recycling significantly affects economy-wide efficiency costs.  A comparison in Table 4 of
columns A4 and A2, or columns A5 and A3, indicates that gross efficiency costs are about 34 percent
lower under recycling via cuts in the marginal rate of the personal income tax than under lump-sum
recycling.  Under policies A4 and A5, the equivalent variation is about $85.9 and $86.7, respectively,
per ton of emissions reduced.  The equivalent variation per dollar of discounted carbon tax revenues is
$.417 and $.421, respectively.  Costs under Policy A5 are higher than under A4 because Policy A5
involves a faster increase in the carbon tax rate.  18This exemplifies the now-familiar result that, abstracting from the value of the environmental improvement
they generate, green taxes tend to be more costly than the “ordinary” taxes they replace.  Although this is the central
result, the opposite outcome can arise when the pre-existing tax system is suboptimal along non-environmental
dimensions (for example, involves overtaxation of capital relative to labor) and the introduction of the environmental
reform helps alleviate the non-environmental inefficiency.  For analysis and discussion of this issue see Bovenberg
and de Mooij (1994), Parry (1995), Goulder (1995b), Bovenberg and Goulder (1997, 2001), and Parry and Bento (1999).
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Thus, recycling via cuts in marginal rates of the personal income tax leads to smaller efficiency
losses than recycling through lump-sum transfers.  Lowering the marginal rates reduces the distortionary
costs of the personal income tax.  This efficiency consequence has been termed the revenue-recycling
effect.  Despite the lower distortionary taxes, the carbon tax package still imposes gross efficiency
costs  because it tends to raise output prices and thereby reduce real returns to labor and capital.  This
tax-interaction effect tends to dominate the revenue-recycling effect.  Hence the carbon tax still
involves an overall economic cost (abstracting from the environmental benefits), even when the
revenues are devoted to cuts in the personal income tax.18
B.  Permits Policies
We now consider several policies geared toward avoiding adverse impacts on the profits of
selected industries.  In particular, these policies are designed to achieve equity-value neutrality: to
avoid any change in the equity values of particular industries.
We first examine how equity-value neutrality can be achieved through policies involving
tradeable CO2 permits.  Three policies are examined in this connection.  Under all of the policies, the
number of permits issued is such as to yield a time-profile for the permits price that matches the carbon
tax time-profile under Policy A2 (or A4):  the permits price starts at $25/ton and rises at 7 percent
annually until the permits price reaches $50/ton.  Because these policies compel fossil fuel producers to
restrict their supplies, they generate potential rents to these producers.
1.  All Permits Auctioned
 Under Policy B1, all the permits are auctioned.  Revenues from the auction are recycled to the
economy in the form of reductions in the marginal rate of the personal income tax.  In this case, the
firms do not retain any rents.  The government collects as revenue from the auction what otherwise
would be privately retained rent.
As indicated by tables 2 and 3, this policy’s effects on output and equity values are  virtually
identical to those under Policy A4.  Under the assumptions of the model, a permits policy involving 10019Three modeling assumptions underlying this correspondence may be noted.  First, the equivalence
between a carbon tax policy and an carbon-emissions permits policy would not hold in a more general model in
which regulators faced uncertainty.  In the presence of uncertainty, taxes and permits policies intended to lead to a
given level of emissions will generally yield different aggregate emissions ex post.  Second, we assume that a cost-
effective allocation of emissions responsibilities is achieved under the permits policy.  This implicitly assumes that
any differences in abatement costs  (associated with heterogeneity in firms’ production methods) are ironed out
through trades of permits.  Third, our model does not distinguish new and old firms (although it does distinguish
installed and newly acquired capital).  The model’s treatment of grandfathering is most consistent with a situation in
which only established firms enjoy the freely offered emissions permits, where these permits are linked to the
(exogenous) initial (or “old”) capital stock.
20This policy is equivalent to a carbon tax (with the time-profile matching that of A-2 or A-4) with
inframarginal exemptions.  The value of the exemption, although tied to actual emissions in the industry (in the
aggregate), would have to be exogenous from the point of view of any individual producer.
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percent auctioning is identical to a carbon tax, provided that permits prices and tax rates have the same
time-profile.19
2.  Some Permits Freely Allocated
Under Policy B2, just enough permits are freely allocated to keep equity values from falling in
the coal and oil&gas industries.20  The rest are auctioned.  In the column for Policy B2 in Table 3, the
numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of permits that must be freely allocated to achieve
equity-value neutrality.  About 8 percent permits need to be freely allocated in the coal industry, and
about 14 percent must be freely allocated in the oil&gas extraction industry.  Overall, 13 percent of the
emissions permits need to be freely allocated.
Because relatively few permits are freely allocated, the government’s sacrifice of revenue is
small, relative to Policy B1.  This implies relatively small loss of efficiency.  As indicated in Table 4,
under this policy the efficiency cost per ton of carbon abatement is $92.3.  This cost is  7.4 percent
higher than under the most efficient policies -- policies A4 or B1.  Thus, avoiding profit losses in the
coal and oil&gas industries involves a fairly modest increase in cost.
We let  a  refer to the share of permits that must be freely allocated to preserve equity values. 
Section 4 indicated that   a   is lower to the extent that the costs of regulation can be shifted forward to
demanders.  In terms of the analysis of Section 4, the ability to shift forward the costs of regulation
means that most of the “R rectangle” lies above the initial price.  When the initial producer surplus or
cash-flow is small in relation to production cost, owners of the quasi-fixed factor (capital) can be fully
compensated for the costs of regulation if they are given just a small piece of the R  rectangle through
the free allocation of permits.  
Forward shifting is large when elasticities of supply are large and elasticities of demand are low. 21In the oil&gas industry, the presence of a fixed factor implies decreasing returns even in the long run.
22The real net-of-tax price of oil&gas is the only exogenous price in the model.  This price is assumed to
increase at a rate of 2.7 percent per year (in keeping with baseline assumptions employed by the Energy Modeling
Forum at Stanford University).  Hence the ratio of the (constant) real carbon tax rate to the (rising) net-of-tax price
declines through time.  This explains why, in Table 4, the percentage increase in the gross-of-tax price of oil&gas
declines after 2004.
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We find that the relevant elasticities of supply are fairly large, and the relevant demand elasticities are
relatively low.  Hence, a  is fairly small.  In the numerical model, the elasticity of supply is determined
by the share of cash-flow (payments to owners of the quasi-fixed factor, capital) in overall production
cost, along with the specification of adjustment costs.   We find that for the coal and oil&gas industries,
cash-flow in the unregulated situation is quite small relative to production cost, which contributes to a
larger supply elasticity.  In addition, although adjustment costs restrict the supply elasticity in the short
run, under our central values for parameters the “average” elasticity (taking into account the medium
and long run) is fairly large.  Indeed, the long run elasticity in the coal industry is infinite because of the
assumption of constant returns to scale.21  These conditions imply that most of the cost from abatement
policies is shifted onto demand.
Table 5 provides further evidence of forward-shifting.  It displays the impact of Policy A4 on
gross and net output prices in the fossil fuel industries at different points in time.   The price-impacts
under other policies are similar.  In the short run, the net-of-tax coal price falls a bit (relative to the
reference-case price), but in the long run the carbon tax is fully shifted forward to users of coal.  Even in
the short run over 90 percent of the tax  is shifted onto consumers of coal.  In the oil&gas industry, the
tax is entirely forward-shifted at all points in time, reflecting the fact that the U.S. is regarded as a price-
taker with respect to oil&gas.22
While Policy B2 preserves profits in the fossil fuel industries, it does not insulate all industries
from negative impacts on profits.  The petroleum refining and electric utilities industries – which utilize
fossil fuels (carbon) most intensively – also endure noticeable losses of profit and equity values, as
indicated by tables 2 and 3.  The policies examined in subsection C below aim to protect these
downstream industries. 
3.  All Permits Freely Allocated  
Under Policy B3, all of the permits are given out free to producers.  Thus, firms are able to
retain the rents corresponding to the area  R  in Figure 1 above.  The effects on prices and output are
very similar to those under policies B1 and B2 as well as the carbon tax policies with comparable time-
profiles for the carbon tax (namely, policies A2 and A4).  However, the effects on the coal and oil&gas
industries are very different.  Under this policy, coal industry profits and equity values rise as a result of18
the policy change.  As indicated in Table 2, profits increase by 155 percent in 2002 (three years after
the policy’s implementation) and by 218 percent in 2025.  Equity values increase by a factor of seven
(Table 3).  Thus, this policy more than compensates owners of fossil fuel firms for the costs associated
with having to reduce supply.  
This policy is considerably more costly to the overall economy than B2.  As indicated in Table
4, the cost per ton of emissions reduction is about $160.  This is approximately 74 percent higher than
the cost under B2 and 87 percent higher than under the most cost-effective policies (A4 and B1).
C.  Compensation through Industry-Specific Corporate Tax Credits
We now consider policies that achieve equity-value neutrality through industry-specific
corporate tax credits.  These policies involved a carbon tax with an identical time-profile to that under
policies A2 or A4.  The revenues from the carbon tax are used to finance the industry-specific
corporate tax credits.  Any remaining excess revenues are used to finance cuts in the marginal rate of
the personal income tax (as under Policy A4).  These corporate tax credits are lump-sum reductions in
the tax payments that firms would otherwise have to make, rather than reductions in the marginal rate of
the corporate income tax.
In the absence of compensation (policies A1-A5), the industries experiencing the largest
percentage reductions in equity values are (in descending order) coal, oil&gas, electric utilities,
petroleum refining, and metals&machinery.  Policies C1 through C4 involve corporate tax credits to
these industries.  Policy C1 offers credits only to the coal and oil&gas industries.  Policies C2 through
C4 respectively add credits to the electric utilities, petroleum refining, and metals&machinery industries.
Introducing these tax credits has very little impact on prices or output of these industries.
However, the tax credits to coal and oil&gas do involve an efficiency cost: as indicated in Table 4, the
efficiency cost per ton of CO2 reduction under Policy C1 is $87.2, 1.5 percent higher than the cost of
the comparable policy that does not involve compensation (Policy A4).   This efficiency cost reflects the
fact that the tax credits absorb government revenue; hence the government must rely more heavily on
distortionary taxes than in the absence of these credits. 
While insulating the coal and oil&gas industries involves a noticeable efficiency cost, the added
efficiency cost of widening the “insulation net” to protect additional, downstream industries is quite
small.  As indicated in Table 4, insulating the electric utility, petroleum refining and metals&machinery
industry increases the efficiency cost by only 0.3 percent  (compare efficiency costs of policies C4 and
C1).  This reflects the fact that much of the cost to these downstream industries is already shifted
forward to consumers – for these industries, the revenue required to provide compensation is fairly
small.  Hence the efficiency sacrifice is small.  Specifically, the present value of the tax credits required19
to compensate the electric utility, petroleum refining, and metals&machinery industries is $28.08 billion. 
This is less than one percent of the present value of carbon tax revenues collected under Policy A4,
which is $3,540 billion.
6.  Conclusions
This study has investigated the distribution of impacts of CO2 abatement policies across major
U.S. industries.  It has also considered the impacts under “standard” abatement policies and explores
the efficiency cost of avoiding adverse impacts through the (partial) free allocation of CO2 permits or
through corporate tax credits.
We find that the efficiency cost of avoiding losses of profit to fossil fuel industries is relatively
modest.  This finding mirrors results obtained in an earlier paper (Bovenberg and Goulder [2000]).  A
key recognition underlying this finding is that CO2 abatement policies have the potential to  produce
very large rents to the regulated firms.  By compelling fossil fuel suppliers to restrict their outputs, the
government effectively causes firms to behave like a cartel, leading to higher prices and the potential for
excess profit.  To the extent that the environmental policy enables the firms to retain these rents – such
is the case under a CO2 policy involving freely offered tradeable permits – the firms can make
considerably higher profit under regulation than in its absence.  Correspondingly, the government needs
to leave with firms only a fraction of these potential rents in order to preserve the profits of the regulated
industries.  In the present research we find that only a small fraction – around 13 percent – of the CO2
permits must freely provided in order to prevent losses of profit to fossil fuel industries under a CO2
abatement policy.
We also examine the cost of protecting profits of other, downstream industries that otherwise
would face significant losses from pollution-abatement policies.  We find that the costs of insulating a
wider group of industries are modest as well.  The reason is that much of the cost of a CO2 policy is
already shifted to consumers; hence the compensation required to offset the loss of profit in these
industries is fairly small.
Two caveats are in order.   First, this analysis concentrates on the costs of preserving profits,
ignoring labor-compensation issues.  To the extent that labor is imperfectly mobile, there can be serious
transition losses from policy changes, in the form of temporary unemployment.  Overcoming barriers to
political feasibility requires attention to these losses.
Second, it is worth emphasizing that the forces underlying the political feasibility of CO2
abatement policies are complex.  Protecting the profits of key energy industries may not be sufficient to20
bring about political feasibility.21
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CO2 Abatement and Profits
RTable 1
Industry and Consumer Goods
Industries
       Gross Output, Year 2000*
Level Percent of Total
1. Agriculture and Non-Coal Mining 1199.9 7.0
2. Coal Mining                           43.2 0.3
3. Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 216.3 1.3
4. Synthetic Fuels 0.0 0.0
5. Petroleum Refining 298.4 1.7
6. Electric Utilities 312.2 1.8
7. Gas Utilities 184.6 1.1
8. Construction                           1476.0 8.6
9. Metals and Machinery                1878.4 11.0
10. Motor Vehicles                       311.5 1.8
11. Miscellaneous Manufacturing      1695.8  9.9
12. Services (except housing)           8016.4 46.9
13. Housing Services                          1456.9 8.5
                                                 
                     
Consumer Goods                           
1. Food                                   






8. Clothing and Jewelry
9. Transportation
10. Motor Vehicles
11. Services (except financial)
12. Financial Services
13. Recreation, Reading, & Misc.
14. Nondurable, Non-Food Household
Expenditure
15. Gasoline and Other Fuels
16. Education
17. Health

























































































































































































































































































































































































































A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 C4
Gross of Tax Output Price      
(2002, 2025)
   Coal Mining 45.8, 54.4 53.2, 105.8 55.3, 107.2 53.2, 105.7 55.3, 107.1 53.2, 105.7 53.2, 105.8 53.3, 105.9 53.2, 105.7 53.2, 105.7 53.2, 105.7 53.2, 105.7
   Oil &Gas 15.4, 9.7 17.6, 19.1 18.3, 19.3 17.6, 19.1 18.3, 19.3 17.6, 19.1 17.6, 19.1 17.6, 19.1 17.6, 19.1 17.6, 19.1 17.6, 19.1 17.6, 19.1
   Petroleum Refining 9.3, 6.6 10.7, 12.8 11.1, 13.0 10.7, 12.8 11.1, 12.9 10.7, 12.8 10.7, 12.8 10.7, 12.8 10.7, 12.8 10.7, 12.8 10.7, 12.8 10.7, 12.8
   Electric Utilities 1.2, 3.7 1.5, 6.5 1.5, 6.6 1.7, 6.2 1.7, 6.3 1.7, 6.2 1.7, 6.2 1.6, 6.5 1.7, 6.2 1.7, 6.2 1.7, 6.2 1.7, 6.2
   Metal and Machinery -0.6, -0.6 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.8, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.6, -1.1 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2
   Average for Other Industries -0.5, -0.6 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.3 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.2 -0.6, -1.2
Output                                    
(2002, 2025)
   Coal Mining -17.9, -26.0 -20.3, -39.2 -20.9, -39.5 -20.1, -38.7 -20.7, -39.0 -20.1, -38.7 -20.1, -38.7 -20.1, -38.7 -20.1, -38.7 -20.1, -38.7 -20.1, -38.7 -20.1, -38.7
   Oil &Gas -3.5, -1.8 -5.1, -5.2 -5.3, -5.2 -5.5, -5.4 -5.6, -5.4 -5.5, -5.4 -5.4, -5.3 -5.1, -5.2 -5.4, -5.4 -5.4, -5.4 -5.4, -5.4 -5.4, -5.4
   Petroleum Refining -6.8, -5.0 -7.7, -9.3 -8.0, -9.4 -7.4, -8.7 -7.7, -8.8 -7.4, -8.7 -7.5, -8.7 -7.6, -9.2 -7.5, -8.7 -7.5, -8.7 -7.5, -8.7 -7.5, -8.7
   Electric Utilities -1.9, -3.6 -2.2, -6.3 -2.2, -6.4 -2.0, -5.5 -2.1, -5.6 -2.0, -5.5 -2.0, -5.5 -2.1, -6.1 -2.0, -5.5 -2.0, -5.5 -2.0, -5.5 -2.0, -5.5
   Metal and Machinery -1.0, -1.1 -1.1, -1.8 -1.1, -1.8 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.6, -1.0 -0.6, -0.6 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2 -0.7, -1.2
   Average for Other Industries -0.4, -0.6 -0.5, -1.0 -0.5, -1.0 -0.1, -0.4 -0.1, -0.4 -0.1, -0.4 -0.1, -0.4 -0.3, -0.7 -0.1, -0.4 -0.1, -0.4 -0.1, -0.4 -0.1, -0.4
After-Tax Profits                  
(2002, 2025)
   Coal Mining            -35.6, -26.6 -38.6, -40.5 -39.5, -40.7 -38.0, -40.0 -38.9, -40.2 -38.0, -40.0 -23.0, -19.9 154.9, 217.6 -38.0, -40.0 -38.0, -40.0 -38.0, -40.0 -38.0, -40.0
   Oil &Gas -4.8, -1.9 -6.4, -5.5 -6.5, -5.6 -6.5, -5.5 -6.7, -5.5 -6.5, -5.5 -2.8, -1.5 19.9, 22.3 -6.5, -5.5 -6.5, -5.5 -6.5, -5.5 -6.5, -5.5
   Petroleum Refining -8.3, -5.0 -9.2, -9.8 -9.5, -9.9 -8.4, -9.1 -8.7, -9.2 -8.4, -9.1 -8.4, -9.1 -8.7, -9.3 -8.5, -9.1 -8.4, -9.1 -8.5, -9.1 -8.5, -9.1
   Electric Utilities -6.2, -3.7 -6.8, -6.9 -7.0, -6.9 -5.4, -6.2 -5.6, -6.2 -5.4, -6.2 -5.5, -6.3 -6.0, -6.5 -5.5, -6.2 -5.5, -6.2 -5.5, -6.2 -5.5, -6.2
   Metal and Machinery -2.7, -2.6 -2.8, -4.5 -2.8, -4.6 -1.4, -3.5 -1.5, -3.5 -1.4, -3.5 -1.3, -3.4 -1.0, -2.3 -1.5, -3.5 -1.5, -3.5 -1.5, -3.5 -1.5, -3.5
   Average for Other Industries -1.0, -1.3 0.0, -2.5 -1.1, -2.6 -0.1, -1.8 -0.2, -1.8 -0.1, -1.8 -0.2, -1.8 -0.6, -2.2 -0.2, -1.8 -0.2, -1.8 -0.2, -1.8 -0.2, -1.8
Table 2: Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies
Policies with No Distributional Adjustments Permits Policies
Carbon Taxes Combined with Corporate Tax 
Credits

























































































































































































































































































































































































































A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 C4
Equity Values of Firms, Year 2000 (percentage 
changes from reference case)
Agriculture and Non-Coal Mining -1.0 -1.7 -1.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal Mining -43.2 -55.8 -57.6 -54.6 -56.4 -54.6
0.0     
(7.8%)
611.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oil&Gas -9.8 -18.5 -18.9 -20.0 -20.4 -20.0
0.0     
(14.0%)
124.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Petroleum Refining -2.8 -4.1 -4.2 -2.2 -2.3 -2.1 -2.3 -3.7 -2.2 -2.2 0.0 0.0
Electric Utilities -4.5 -6.7 -6.9 -4.2 -4.4 -4.2 -4.3 -5.9 -4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Natural Gas Utilities 1.6 1.9 2.0 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.1 2.6 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Construction -1.8 -2.7 -2.8 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.0 -1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
Metals and Machinery -2.5 -3.5 -3.6 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0 0.0
Motor Vehicles -0.7 -1.2 -1.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 1.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1
Miscellaneous Manufacturing -2.3 -3.4 -3.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.9 -1.6 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Services (except housing) -0.7 -1.1 -1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 -0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Housing Services -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4 -0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Total -1.1 -1.8 -1.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9 -0.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Table 3: Equity Values
Policies with No Distributional 
Adjustments
Permits Policies


























































































































































































































































































































































































































A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 C4
Emissions
     Absolute Change -11.42 -17.58 -17.92 -17.20 -17.55 -17.20 -17.23 -17.50 -17.22 -17.22 -17.22 -17.22
     Percentage Change  -14.84 -22.85 -23.29 -22.35 -22.81 -22.36 -22.39 -22.74 -22.38 -22.38 -22.38 -22.38
Present Value of Carbon Tax Revenues 2113.4 3553.0 3608.6 3540.2 3617.0 3541.1 3212.3 0.0 3540.7 3540.6 3540.6 3540.5
Efficiency Cost
     Absolute 1190.0 2228.0 2280.0 1478.0 1522.0 1478.0 1591.0 2810.0 1501.4 1504.8 1506.0 1506.2
     Per Ton of CO2 Reduction  104.2 126.7 127.2 85.9 86.7 85.9 92.3 160.5 87.2 87.4 87.5 87.5
     Per Dollar of Carbon Tax Revenue 0.563 0.630 0.632 0.417 0.421 0.417 0.495 NA 0.424 0.425 0.425 0.425
Policies with No Distributional 
Adjustments
Permits Policies
Carbon Taxes Combined with 
Corporate Tax Credits
Table 4:  Emissions, Revenues, and Efficiency CostsTable 5
Price Responses under Carbon Tax*
Ratio of Price under Policy Change to Reference-Case Price
2000 2001 2002 2004 2010 2025 2050
Coal Industry
               Output price gross of carbon tax 1.139 1.321 1.533 1.632 1.990 2.054 2.057
               Output price net of carbon tax 0.973 0.966 0.963 0.979 0.991 0.995 0.998
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry
               Output price gross of carbon tax 1.054 1.130 1.176 1.192 1.251 1.191 1.136
               Output price net of carbon tax 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
* Results are for Policy A4.  Coal and oil&gas price responses are very similar under the other policies.